

**OPINION**

**Date of adoption: 21 January 2015**

**Case No. 262/09**

**Biljana KUZMANOVIĆ**

**against**

**UNMIK**

The Human Rights Advisory Panel, sitting on 21 January 2015,

with the following members present:

Marek Nowicki, Presiding Member

Christine Chinkin

Françoise Tulkens

Assisted by

Andrey Antonov, Executive Officer

Having considered the aforementioned complaint, introduced pursuant to Section 1.2 of UNMIK Regulation No. 2006/12 of 23 March 2006 on the establishment of the Human Rights Advisory Panel,

Having deliberated, makes the following findings and recommendations:

1. **PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE PANEL**
2. The complaint was introduced on 6 April 2009 and registered on 30 April 2009.
3. On 23 December 2009, the Panel requested further information from the complainant. No response was received.
4. On 24 November 2010, the Panel repeated its request for further information to the complainant. However, no response was received.
5. On 23 September 2011, the complaint was communicated to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG)[[1]](#footnote-1), for UNMIK’s comments on its admissibility.
6. On 28 September 2011, the Panel again requested further information from the complainant.
7. On 8 November 2011, the SRSG provided UNMIK’s response.
8. On 20 December 2011, additional information was received from the complainant.
9. On 26 September 2012, the Panel declared the complaint admissible.
10. On 8 October 2012, the Panel forwarded its decision on admissibility to the SRSG requesting UNMIK’s comments on the merits of the complaint, as well as copies of the investigative files relevant to the case. On 15 March 2013, the SRSG provided UNMIK’s comments on the merits of the complaint, together with copies of the investigative files.
11. On 12 January 2015, the Panel requested UNMIK to confirm if the disclosure of files concerning the case could be considered final. On 13 January 2015, UNMIK provided its response.
12. **THE FACTS**
13. **General background[[2]](#footnote-2)**
14. The events at issue took place in the territory of Kosovo shortly after the establishment in June 1999 of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).
15. The armed conflict during 1998 and 1999 between the Serbian forces on one side and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other Kosovo Albanian armed groups on the other is well documented. Following the failure of international efforts to resolve the conflict, on 23 March 1999, the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) announced the commencement of air strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The air strikes began on 24 March 1999 and ended on 8 June 1999 when the FRY agreed to withdraw its forces from Kosovo. On 9 June 1999, the International Security Force (KFOR), the FRY and the Republic of Serbia signed a “Military Technical Agreement” by which they agreed on FRY withdrawal from Kosovo and the presence of an international security force following an appropriate UN Security Council Resolution.
16. On 10 June 1999, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 (1999). Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council decided upon the deployment of international security and civil presences - KFOR and UNMIK respectively - in the territory of Kosovo. Pursuant to Security Council Resolution No. 1244 (1999), the UN was vested with full legislative and executive powers for the interim administration of Kosovo, including the administration of justice. KFOR was tasked with establishing “a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can return home in safety” and temporarily ensuring “public safety and order” until the international civil presence could take over responsibility for this task. UNMIK comprised four main components or pillars led by the United Nations (civil administration), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (humanitarian assistance, which was phased out in June 2000), the OSCE (institution building) and the EU (reconstruction and economic development). Each pillar was placed under the authority of the SRSG. UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) mandated UNMIK to “promote and protect human rights” in Kosovo in accordance with internationally recognised human rights standards.
17. Estimates regarding the effect of the conflict on the displacement of the Kosovo Albanian population range from approximately 800,000 to 1.45 million. Following the adoption of Resolution 1244 (1999), the majority of Kosovo Albanians who had fled, or had been forcibly expelled from their houses by the Serbian forces during the conflict, returned to Kosovo.
18. Meanwhile, members of the non-Albanian community – mainly but not exclusively Serbs, Roma and Slavic Muslims – as well as Kosovo Albanians suspected of collaboration with the Serbian authorities, became the target of widespread attacks by Kosovo Albanian armed groups. Current estimates relating to the number of Kosovo Serbs displaced fall within the region of 200,000 to 210,000. Whereas most Kosovo Serbs and other non-Albanians fled to Serbia proper and the neighbouring countries, those remaining behind became victims of systematic killings, abductions, arbitrary detentions, sexual and gender based violence, beatings and harassment.
19. Although figures remain disputed, it is estimated that more than 15,000 deaths or disappearances occurred during and in the immediate aftermath of the Kosovo conflict (1998-2000). More than 3,000 ethnic Albanians, and about 800 Serbs, Roma and members of other minority communities went missing during this period. More than half of the missing persons had been located and their mortal remains identified by the end of 2010, while 1,766 are listed as still missing by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as of October 2012.
20. As of July 1999, as part of the efforts to restore law enforcement in Kosovo within the framework of the rule of law, the SRSG urged UN member States to support the deployment within the civilian component of UNMIK of 4,718 international police personnel. UNMIK Police were tasked with advising KFOR on policing matters until they themselves had sufficient numbers to take full responsibility for law enforcement and to work towards the development of a Kosovo police service. By September 1999, approximately 1,100 international police officers had been deployed to UNMIK.
21. By December 2000, the deployment of UNMIK Police was almost complete with 4,400 personnel from 53 different countries, and UNMIK had assumed primacy in law enforcement responsibility in all regions of Kosovo except for Mitrovicë/Mitrovica. According to the 2000 Annual Report of UNMIK Police, 351 kidnappings, 675 murders and 115 rapes had been reported to them in the period between June 1999 and December 2000.
22. Due to the collapse of the administration of justice in Kosovo, UNMIK established in June 1999 an Emergency Justice System. This was composed of a limited number of local judges and prosecutors and was operational until a regular justice system became operative in January 2000. In February 2000, UNMIK authorised the appointment of international judges and prosecutors, initially in the Mitrovicë/Mitrovica region and later across Kosovo, to strengthen the local justice system and to guarantee its impartiality. As of October 2002, the local justice system comprised 341 local and 24 international judges and prosecutors. In January 2003, the UN Secretary-General reporting to the Security Council on the implementation of Resolution 1244 (1999) defined the police and justice system in Kosovo at that moment as being “well-functioning” and “sustainable”.
23. In July 1999, the UN Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that UNMIK already considered the issue of missing persons as a particularly acute human rights concern in Kosovo. In November 1999, a Missing Persons Unit (MPU) was established within UNMIK Police, mandated to investigate with respect to either the possible location of missing persons and/or gravesites. The MPU, jointly with the Central Criminal Investigation Unit (CCIU) of UNMIK Police, and later a dedicated War Crimes Investigation Unit (WCIU), were responsible for the criminal aspects of missing persons cases in Kosovo. In May 2000, a Victim Recovery and Identification Commission (VRIC) chaired by UNMIK was created for the recovery, identification and disposition of mortal remains. On 5 November 2001, UNMIK signed the UNMIK-FRY Common Document, which among other things reiterated the commitment of solving the fate of missing persons from all communities and recognised that the exhumation and identification programme is only part of the activities related to missing persons. As of June 2002, the newly established Office on Missing Persons and Forensics (OMPF) in the UNMIK Department of Justice (DOJ) became the sole authority mandated to determine the whereabouts of missing persons, identify their mortal remains and return them to the family of the missing. Starting from 2001, based on a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between UNMIK and the Sarajevo-based International Commission of Missing Persons (ICMP), supplemented by a further agreement in 2003, the identification of mortal remains was carried out by the ICMP through DNA testing.
24. On 9 December 2008, UNMIK’s responsibility with regard to police and justice in Kosovo ended with the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) assuming full operational control in the area of the rule of law, following the Statement made by the President of the United Nations Security Council on 26 November 2008 (S/PRST/2008/44), welcoming the continued engagement of the European Union in Kosovo.
25. On the same date, UNMIK and EULEX signed a MoU on the modalities, and the respective rights and obligations arising from the transfer from UNMIK to EULEX of cases and the related files which involved on-going investigations, prosecutions and other activities undertaken by UNMIK International Prosecutors. Shortly thereafter, similar agreements were signed with regard to the files handled by international judges and UNMIK Police. All agreements obliged EULEX to provide to UNMIK access to the documents related to the actions previously undertaken by UNMIK authorities. Between 9 December 2008 and 30 March 2009, all criminal case files held by the UNMIK DOJ and UNMIK Police were supposed to be handed over to EULEX.
26. **Circumstances surrounding the abduction and killing of Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović**
27. The complainant is the wife of Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović.
28. The complainant states that, on 21 June 1999, her husband was abducted by members of the KLA from their family house in Gjakovё/Ðakovica. He was not seen alive again.
29. In her submission to the Panel of December 2011, the complainant relates the account of her husband’s abduction as given by Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović’s mother, Mrs L.K., and a late neighbour, Mr V.S., who was kidnapped by the KLA and detained in the same place as Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović and eventually managed to escape. According to this account, Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović and Mr V.S. were abducted by KLA members on 21 June 1999 under the watch of KFOR Italian soldiers. They were taken to a building housing a driving school in Gjakovё/Ðakovica where they were subject to mistreatments and torture. Among the kidnappers, Mr V.S. recognised I.Re. from the village of Ponoshec/Ponoševac and their next-door neighbour Mr D.Ra. On an unspecified date, Mr V.S. managed to escape. With the help of some Albanian neighbours, he was able to reach a different group of KFOR soldiers, who took him to Deçan/Dečani and Pejë/Peć and from there to Montenegro, where also the complainant had also found refuge.
30. The complainant states that, on the day after the abduction, Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović’s mother made a report to the UNMIK Police and that the matter was also reported to KFOR, the Yugoslav Red Cross, and the International Prosecutor’s Office in Prishtinё/Priština. However, she is not aware of any investigation conducted by UNMIK or KFOR.
31. The name of Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović appears in two lists of missing persons communicated by the ICRC to the UNMIK Police on 21 October 2001 and on 11 February 2002 respectively, for which ante-mortem data had been gathered in Serbia proper. His name also appears on the database compiled by the UNMIK OMPF[[3]](#footnote-3). The entry in relation to Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović in the online database maintained by the ICMP[[4]](#footnote-4) reads in relevant fields: “Sufficient Reference Samples Collected” and “ICMP has provided information on this missing person on 03-17-2003 to authorized institution. To obtain additional information, contact EULEX Kosovo Headquarters.”
32. The complainant states that UNMIK handed over the mortal remains of her husband on 23 May 2003.

**C. The investigation**

*Disclosure of relevant files*

1. On 15 March 2013, UNMIK provided to the Panel documents which were held previously by the UNMIK Police and EULEX. On 13 January 2015, UNMIK confirmed to the Panel that all files in UNMIK’s possession have been disclosed.
2. Concerning disclosure of information contained in the files, the Panel recalls that UNMIK has made available investigative files for the Panel’s review under a pledge of confidentiality. In this regard, the Panel must clarify that although its assessment of the present case stems from a thorough examination of the available documentation, only limited information contained therein is disclosed. Hence a synopsis of relevant investigative steps taken by investigative authorities is provided in the paragraphs to follow.
3. The earliest document in the investigative file is the first page of an UNMIK “Police Enquiry Proforma” dated 4 September 1999, which states that Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović’s sister (complete name, home address and telephone number in Serbia proper provided) had called to report the abduction of her brother, which had occurred in the presence of their mother, Mrs L.K., on 21 June 1999. The description of the abduction appears to continue on the following page of the document, which, however, is not included in the file. The file also contains the first page of a second “Police Enquiry Proforma”, dated 21 September 1999, which states that Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović’s sister had called again to provide information that an unidentified person had called her one month earlier saying that her brother, who was missing since June 1999, was still alive. It is not possible to read the content of the rest of the report as the remaining pages of this document are also not in the file.
4. The next document in the file is a memorandum, dated 26 February 2000, from the UNMIK MPU to the Police Regional Commanders in Prishtinë/Priština, Prizren, Gjilan/Gnjilane, Pejë/Peć and Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, to the Chief of the Criminal Investigation Unit, the Chief Border Police and KFOR. The memorandum states that the MPU had registered Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović as a missing person following the report made by his sister. It was therefore requested from all concerned offices to check their records and sources in an effort to gather additional information about his disappearance. Included in the file are also the negative responses to this request received from the Prizren, Prishtinë/Priština and Pejë/Peć Regional Investigation Units on 1 March, 5 March and 18 March 2000 respectively.
5. The file contains an MPU Case Continuation Report for the case of Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović, affixed with case no. 1999-000119. The Report lists six entries from 25 June 2000 to 15 July 2003, in which ante-mortem data concerning Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović was inputted into the database. Included in the file is an undated ICRC Victim Identification Form for Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović, also affixed with case no. 1999-000119. Besides containing Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović’s ante-mortem information and photograph, the Form provides the address and telephone number of his brother in Serbia proper.
6. The file also includes an internal e-mail of the UNMIK MPU, dated 20 April 2003, related to the case of Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović which states that his mortal remains had been found on 10 February 2002 and that a family visit needed to be made in order to arrange their handover. In the field “Status of investigation” the e-mail reads: “No current investigation. Pec RIU has been informed of the identification and may reopen the file”. In the file are copies of the Death Certificate and Identification Certificate issued by the OMPF stating that, according to an autopsy conducted in December 2002, Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović’s death was caused by “ballistic injuries to the spine”. An ICMP DNA report dated 14 March 2003 and an OMPF Confirmation of Identity Certificate dated 7 April 2003 are also included in the file. Further OMPF documentation shows that the mortal remains of Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović were returned to his family on 23 May 2003.
7. The file shows that, on 10 May 2004, the Coordination Centre for Kosovo and Metohija on behalf of the complainant filed a criminal complaint with the International Public Prosecutor in Prishtinë/Priština, an English copy of which is included in the file. The complaint is affixed with UNMIK Police WCIU case file no. 2000-00104 and bears a translation note of 15 July 2004. It states that D.Ra. from Gjakovё/Ðakovica (the same individual mentioned in § 25 above) and “the son of [A.A.]” were responsible for the kidnapping of Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović and Mr M.J., which occurred on 21 June 1999 in Gjakovё/Ðakovica, as well as for their subsequent murder. The complaint states that Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović’s mother, Mrs L.K., and Mr M.J.’s wife had been eye-witnesses to their respective son’s and husband’s abduction. Both victims had been taken to a KLA base known as “AMC”, located “by the road to Prizren” and tortured. Mr V.S. (the same person mentioned in § 25 above), who was detained and tortured at the same location, had given a statement in this respect.
8. The remaining documents in the file include an exchange of e-mails between UNMIK Police and the OMPF, dating back to July 2004, concerning a different criminal case. A five-page e-mail from the UNMIK Police, dated 22 July 2004, states that this case involved “the abduction, unlawful detention, and torture of thirteen (13) individuals committed on various dated from June 1998 to August 2008”. The memorandum states that the suspects for these crimes were all KLA members, five of whom “presently working with the KPC/TMK occupying various ranks and posts”. It lists Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović as among those kidnapped in November 1999 by “the Eagles”, a special secret unit within the KLA 131st brigade. One E.S., is indicated as the main suspect of this and other crimes. It follows an UNMIK Police Interoffice Memorandum addressed to the WCIU, dated 27 February 2005, whose subject reads: “Murder”. This memorandum states that a named KLA commander, D.Re. (an individual with the same surname as the person mentioned by the complainant § 25 above) and approximately 35 other KLA members kidnapped six “Serbia people”, including Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović, during the Kosovo war and took them to a KLA detention camp located in a village near Pristhinë/Priština. On the orders of the above-mentioned D.Re., the six prisoners were killed. There are no further documents in the file related to this particular investigation.
9. The latest documents in the file are two requests to conduct an investigation, issued by an International Prosecutor at the EULEX Special Prosecution Office (SPRK) in connection with UNMIK Police case file no. 2000-00104. The first request, dated 26 April 2009, states that potential witnesses in the kidnapping and killing of Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović - the latter’s mother and Mr V.S. (the same individual mentioned in §§ 25 and 35 above) - shall be interviewed. The second request, dated 15 June 2009, and addressed to the EULEX “War Crimes Police”, stated that R.Da. (the same individual mentioned in §§ 25 and 35 above) should be interviewed as a suspect in the kidnapping and killing of Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović.

1. **THE COMPLAINT**
2. The complainant complains about UNMIK’s alleged failure to properly investigate the abduction and killing of Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović. In this regard, the Panel deems that the complainant invokes a violation of the procedural limb of Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
3. **THE LAW**
4. **Alleged violation of the procedural obligation underArticle 2 of the ECHR**
	1. **The scope of the Panel’s review**
5. Before turning to the examination of the merits of the complaint, the Panel needs to clarify the scope of its review.
6. In determining whether it considers that there has been a violation of Article 2 (procedural limb) the Panel is mindful of the existing case-law, notably that of the European Court of Human Rights. However, the Panel is also aware that the complaints before it differ in some significant ways from those brought before that Court. First, the respondent is not a State but an interim international territorial administration mandated to exercise temporary responsibilities in Kosovo. No suspicion attaches to UNMIK with respect to the substantive obligations under Article 2 of the ECHR. Second, as in a limited number of cases before the European Court, those suspected of being responsible for the alleged killings and/or abductions are in all cases before the Panel non-state actors, mostly but not exclusively connected to the conflict. These are factors for the Panel to take into consideration as it assesses the procedural positive obligations of an intergovernmental organisation with respect to acts committed by third parties in a territory over which it has temporary legislative, executive and judicial control.
7. The Panel notes that with the adoption of the UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/1 on 25 July 1999 UNMIK undertook an obligation to observe internationally recognised human rights standards in exercising its functions. This undertaking was detailed in UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/24 of 12 December 1999, by which UNMIK assumed obligations under the following human rights instruments: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights and Protocols thereto, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, [the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment](http://untreaty.un.org/English/TreatyEvent2001/pdf/07e.pdf), the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

1. The Panel also notes that Section 1.2 of UNMIK Regulation No. 2006/12 of 23 March 2006 on the Establishment of the Human Rights Advisory Panel provides that the Panel “shall examine complaints from any person or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by UNMIK of (their) human rights”. It follows that only acts or omissions attributable to UNMIK fall within the jurisdiction *ratione personae* of the Panel. In this respect, it should be noted, as stated above, that as of 9 December 2008, UNMIK no longer exercises executive authority over the Kosovo judiciary and law enforcement machinery. Therefore UNMIK bears no responsibility for any violation of human rights allegedly committed by those bodies. Insofar as the complainants complain about acts that occurred after that date, they fall outside the jurisdiction *ratione personae* of the Panel.
2. Likewise, the Panel emphasises that, as far as its jurisdiction *ratione materiae* is concerned, as follows from Section 1.2 of UNMIK Regulation No. 2006/12, it can only examine complaints relating to an alleged violation of human rights. This means that it can only review acts or omissions complained of for their compatibility with the international human rights instruments referred to above (see § 41). In the particular case of killings and disappearances in life-threatening circumstances, it is not the Panel’s role to replace the competent authorities in the investigation of the case. Its task is limited to examining the effectiveness of the criminal investigation into such killings and disappearances, in the light of the procedural obligations flowing from Article 2 of the ECHR.
3. The Panel further notes that Section 2 of UNMIK Regulation No. 2006/12 provides that the Panel shall have jurisdiction over complaints relating to alleged violations of human rights “that had occurred not earlier than 23 April 2005 or arising from facts which occurred prior to this date where these facts give rise to a continuing violation of human rights”. It follows that events that took place before 23 April 2005 generally fall outside the jurisdiction *ratione temporis* of the Panel. However, to the extent that such events gave rise to a continuing situation, the Panel has jurisdiction to examine complaints relating to that situation (see European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Grand Chamber [GC], *Varnava and Others v. Turkey*, nos. 16064/90 and others, judgment of 18 September 2009, §§ 147-149; ECtHR, *Cyprus v. Turkey* [GC] no. 25781/94, judgment of 10 May 2001, § 136, ECHR 2001-IV).
	1. **The Parties’ submissions**
4. The complainant in substance alleges a violation concerning the lack of an adequate criminal investigation into the abduction and killing of Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović.
5. In his comments on the merits of the complaint, the SRSG does not dispute that UNMIK had a responsibility to conduct an effective investigation into the abduction and killing of Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović**,** in line with its general obligation to secure the effective implementation of the domestic laws which protect the right to life, given to it by UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) and further defined by UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/1 *On the Authority of the Interim Administration in Kosovo* and subsequently, UNMIK Regulation 1999/24 *On the Law Applicable in Kosovo,* and Article 2 of the ECHR.
6. In this regard, the SRSG stresses that this responsibility stems from the procedural obligation under Article 2 of the ECHR to conduct an effective investigation where death occurs in suspicious circumstances not imputable to State agents. He argues that, in general, when considering whether UNMIK has satisfied its procedural obligations under Article 2 of the ECHR, the Panel must take into consideration the special circumstances in Kosovo at the time.
7. The SRSG adds that from June 1999, “the security situation in post-conflict Kosovo was tense: KFOR was still in the process of reaching sufficient strength to maintain public safety and law and order; and there were a number of serious criminal incidents targeting Kosovo-Serbs, including abductions and killings.” Citing the UN Secretary-General’s report to the United Nations Security Council of 12 June 1999, the SRSG describes the situation as follows:

“The general situation in Kosovo has been tense but is stabilizing. The KLA has rapidly moved back into all parts of Kosovo, in particular the south-west, and a large number of Kosovo Serbs have left their homes for Serbia. While the first wave of Kosovo Serb departures was prompted by security concerns rather than by actual threats, a second wave of departures resulted from an increasing number of incidents committed by Kosovo Albanians against Kosovo Serbs. In particular, high profile killings and abductions, as well as looting, arsons and forced expropriation of apartments, have prompted departures. This process has now slowed down, but such cities as Prizren and Pec are practically deserted by Kosovo Serbs, and the towns of Mitrovica and Orahovac are divided along ethnic lines.

The security problem in Kosovo is largely a result of the absence of law and order institutions and agencies. Many crimes and injustices cannot be properly pursued. Criminal gangs competing for control over scarce resources are already exploiting this void. While KFOR is currently responsible for maintaining public safety and civil law and order, its ability to do so is limited due to the fact that it is still in the process of building up its forces. The absence of a legitimate police force, both international and local, is deeply felt, and therefore will have to be addressed as a matter of priority.”

1. The SRSG underlines that the complainant does not allege a violation of the substantive part of Article 2, but rather of its procedural element. The SRSG states that “the procedural element of Article 2 is essentially two-fold: (i) an obligation to determine through investigation the fate and/or whereabouts of the missing person; and (ii) an obligation to conduct an investigation capable of determining whether the death was caused unlawfully and leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible for the disappearance and/or death of the missing person”.
2. The SRSG further observes that when determining applications under Article 2, procedural part, consideration must be given to not imposing an impossible or disproportionate burden on UNMIK. In this regard, the SRSG recalls the judgment of 15 February 2011 rendered by the European Court of Human Rights in the case *Palić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina*, stating at paragraph 70:

“The Court takes into account the complex situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, notably in the first ten years following the war. In such a post-conflict situation, what amounts to an impossible and/or disproportionate burden must be measured by the very particular facts and context. In this connection, the Court notes that more than 100,000 people were killed, almost 30,000 people went missing and more than two million people were displaced during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Inevitably choices had to be made in terms of post-war priorities and resources. Furthermore, after a long and brutal war, Bosnia and Herzegovina underwent fundamental overhaul of its internal structure and political system: Entities and Cantons were set up pursuant to the Dayton Peace Agreement, power-sharing arrangements were introduced in order to ensure effective equality between the “constituent peoples” in the post-conflict society (see *Sejdić and Finci* v. Bosnia Herzegovina [GC], nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06, ECHR 2009-…), new institutions had to be created and the existing ones had to be restructured. Some reluctance on the part of the former warring parties to work with those new institutions could be expected in the post-war period, as evidenced in the present case. While it is difficult to pinpoint when exactly this process ended, the Court considers that the domestic legal system should have become capable of dealing effectively with disappearances and other serious violations of international humanitarian law by 2005, following comprehensive vetting of the appointment of police and judiciary and the establishment of the War Crimes Sections within the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. All this considered and since there has been no substantial period of inactivity post-2005 on the part of the domestic authorities in the present case, the Court concludes that, in the circumstances obtaining at the material time, the domestic criminal investigation can be considered to have been conducted with reasonable promptness and expedition.

1. In the view of the SRSG, UNMIK faced a very similar situation in Kosovo “from 1999 to 2008” as the one in Bosnia and Herzegovina “from 1995 to 2005”.
2. The SRSG states that during the Kosovo conflict thousands of people went missing, at least 800,000 people were displaced and thousands were killed. Many of the persons who went missing were abducted, killed, and buried in unmarked graves inside or outside Kosovo, which made very difficult locating and recovering their mortal remains.
3. In June 2002, UNMIK created the OMPF with the mandate to determine the fate of the missing; however its work was faced with many challenges at the beginning of its operations, due to the work previously done mostly by actors independent from UNMIK. In particular, the SRSG states that the collection of evidence of war crimes began with the arrival of NATO in 1999 with independent teams from several countries operating under the loose coordination of the ICTY. A lack of standard operating procedures or centralisation led to problems with the evidence gathered in this phase. In 2000, ICTY launched a large, centralised forensic operation, based at the Rahovec/Orahovac mortuary, with standard operating procedures for all forensic teams except the British one, which operated independently out of Prishtinë/Priština. The SRSG states that, in the effort to demonstrate that crimes were systematic and widespread, the ICTY teams conducted autopsies on as many bodies as possible, carrying out little or no identification work; moreover, unidentified bodies exhumed in 1999 were reburied in locations still unknown to the OMPF. After the ICTY closed their operation in 2000, the UNMIK Police MPU continued small-scale investigations on missing persons “*ex-officio*, without any broader prosecutorial strategy”. As a consequence, a large amount of unstructured information was collected.
4. The SRSG states that locating and identifying the missing in the context described above is a very difficult and time-consuming task. He further states that the number of missing persons recovered and identified by OMPF is “testament to the vigour of its work between 2002-2008” and that “more bodies continued to be located in burial sites and more identifications and returns to family members are taking place, often based on information contained in UNMIK-OMPF files”. The SRSG continues that “therefore, it is apparent that the process for establishing a system capable of dealing effectively with disappearances and other serious violations of international humanitarian law has been an understandably incremental one” in Kosovo as reflected in the *Palić* case referred to above. The SRSG further notes that this process was “reliant on a number of actors rather than just UNMIK, for example the International Commission on Missing Persons, the International Committee of the Red Cross and local missing persons organisations.”
5. The SRSG further argues that fundamental to conducting effective investigations is a professional, well-trained and well-resourced police force and that such a force did not exist in Kosovo in the aftermath of the conflict. In the policing vacuum following the end of the conflict, UNMIK had to build a new Kosovo Police Service from scratch, a long and challenging task which, according to the SRSG, is still in progress. The SRSG also states that UNMIK Police faced numerous challenges in exercising law enforcement functions gradually transferred to it by KFOR in 1999-2000. In this regard, he refers to the UNMIK Police Annual Report of 2000 describing the situation as follows:

“UNMIK Police had to deal with the aftermath of war, with dead bodies and the looted and burned houses. Ethnic violence flared through illegal evictions, forcible takeovers of properties, the burning of houses and physical violence against communities all over Kosovo. Tempers and tensions were running high amongst all ethnic groups, exacerbated by reports of missing and dead persons. It became imperative for UNMIK Police to establish order and to quickly construct a framework to register and investigate crimes.

All of this had to be done, with limited physical and human resources. Being the first executive mission in the history of the UN, the concept, planning and implementation was being developed on the ground. With 20 different contributory nationalities at the beginning, it was very challenging task for police managers to establish common practices for optimum results in a high-risk environment.”

1. The SRSG states that UNMIK international police officers had to adjust to conducting investigations in a foreign territory and cultures, with limited support from the still developing Kosovo Police. He further states that these investigators were often faced with situations where individuals holding relevant knowledge on the whereabouts and fate of missing persons did not want to disclose this information. According to the SRSG, “[s]uch constraints inhibited the ability of an institution such as UNMIK Police to conduct all investigations in a manner […] that may be demonstrated, or at least expected, in other States with more established institutions and without the surge in cases of this nature associated with a post-conflict situation.”
2. With regard to the case of Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović, the SRSG asserts that, according to the available documents, upon receiving information about his disappearance, the UNMIK MPU requested “regional offices, border authorities, CCIU, KFOR, ICRC and OSCE” to provide relevant information. However, “[n]o information was received and no leads could be found to further base any investigation upon”. The SRSG further states that on 4 September 1999, and again, on 21 October 1999, Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović’s sister called UNMIK Police by telephone to report the abduction and to say that, according to information received, he was still alive. The SRSG states that “[h]owever, neither of these reports from family members provided any leads or information for further investigation”.
3. The SRSG states that, “[d]espite the difficulties mentioned above”, the mortal remains of Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović were discovered in 2002. An autopsy conducted in December 2002 established the cause of his death. The mortal remains of Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović were subsequently identified through DNA testing and returned to the family on 23 May 2003. For this reason, in the view of the SRSG, the investigation aimed at establishing the fate of Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović was conducted within a reasonable time.
4. With respect to the investigation aimed at identifying the perpetrators and bringing them to justice, the SRSG states that “lack of information in the instant case posed a real hurdle to the conduct of any investigation by UNMIK” and that “the lack of witnesses or suspects impeded the identification of possible perpetrators to be brought to justice”. The SRSG further argues that the exchange of e-mails of 22 July 2004 and the interoffice memorandum of 27 February 2005 included in the file, indicate that UNMIK Police continued its investigation on the killing of Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović, even after finding his mortal remains and handing them over to his family.
5. The SRSG concludes that, in view of the foregoing, “it is evident that UNMIK Police did conduct investigative efforts in accordance with the procedural requirements of Article 2 of ECHR”. He states that, however, “[a]s there is the possibility that additional and conclusive information exists, beyond the documents mentioned above, UNMIK reserves its right to make further comments on the matter”.
6. The SRSG finally adds that the allegations made by the complainant in her submission to the Panel dated 20 December 2011, shall not be “considered by the HRAP in its considerations of actions taken by UNMIK Police”, as they are “new allegations which had never been reported by UNMIK Police”.
	1. **The Panel’s assessment**
7. The Panel considers that the complainant invokes a violation of the procedural obligation stemming from the right to life, guaranteed by Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in that UNMIK did not conduct an effective investigation into the abduction and killing of Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović.
8. *Submission of relevant files*

1. At the Panel’s request, on 18 April 2012, the SRSG provided copies of the documents related to this investigation, which UNMIK was able to recover. The SRSG also suggested that there is a possibility more information, not contained in the presented documents, exists, but provided no further details (see § 60 above). On 13 January 2015, UNMIK confirmed to the Panel that no more files have been located, thus the disclosure may be considered complete (see § 10 above).
2. The Panel notes that Section 15 of UNMIK Regulation No. 2006/12 states that the Panel may request the submission from UNMIK of any documents and that the SRSG shall cooperate with the Panel and provide the necessary assistance including, in particular, in the release of documents and information relevant to the complaint. The Panel in this regard refers to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights that inferences shall be drawn from the conduct of the respondent party during the proceedings, including from its failure “to submit information in their hands without a satisfactory explanation” (see ECtHR, *Çelikbilek v. Turkey*, no. 27693/95, judgment of 31 May 2005*,* § 56).
3. Furthermore, the Panel notes that the proper maintenance of investigative files concerning crimes such as killings and disappearances, from the opening of the investigations to their handing over, is crucial to the continuation of such investigations and failure to do so could thus raise *per se* issues under Article 2 (see HRAP, *Bulatović*, no. 166/09, opinion of 13 November 2014, § 62).
4. The Panel has no reason to doubt that UNMIK undertook all efforts in order to obtain the relevant investigative files. However, the Panel notes that UNMIK has not provided any explanation as to why the documentation may be incomplete, nor with respect to which parts.
5. The Panel itself is not in the position to verify the completeness of the investigative files received. The Panel will therefore assess the merits of the complaint on the basis of documents made available (in this sense, see ECtHR, *Tsechoyev v. Russia*, no. 39358/05, judgment of15 March 2011, § 146).
6. *General principles concerning the obligation to conduct an effective investigation under Article 2*
7. The Panel notes that the positive obligation to investigate has been stated by the HRC as stemming from Article 6 (right to life), Article 7 (prohibition of cruel and inhuman treatment) and Article 9 (right to liberty and security of person), read in conjunction with Articles 2 (3) (right to an effective remedy) of the ICCPR (see United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC), General Comment No. 6, 30 April 1982, § 4; HRC, General Comment No. 31, 26 May 2004, §§ 8 and 18, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13; see also, among others, HRC, *Mohamed El Awani, v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya*, communication no. 1295/2004, views of 11 July 2007, CCPR/C/90/D/1295/2004). The obligation to investigate disappearances and killings is also asserted in the UN Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearances (UN Document A/Res/47/133, 18 December 1992), and further detailed in UN guidelines such as the UN Manual on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal Arbitrary and Summary Executions (1991) and the “Guidelines for the Conduct of United Nations Inquiries into Allegations of Massacres” (1995). The importance of the obligation is confirmed by the adoption of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance in 2006, which entered into force on 23 December 2010.
8. In order to address the complainant’s allegations, the Panel refers to the well-established case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on the procedural obligation under Article 2 of the ECHR. The Court has held that “[The] obligation to protect the right to life under Article 2, read in conjunction with the State's general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to “secure to everyone within [its] jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in [the] Convention”, requires by implication that there should be some form of effective official investigation when individuals have been killed (see, *mutatis mutandis*, ECtHR, *McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom*, judgment of 27 September 1995, § 161, Series A no. 324; and ECtHR, *Kaya v. Turkey*, judgment of 19 February 1998, § 86, Reports 1998-I; see also ECtHR, *Jasinskis v. Latvia*, no. 45744/08, judgment of 21 December 2010, § 71). The duty to conduct such an investigation arises in all cases of killing and other suspicious death, whether the perpetrators were private persons or State agents or are unknown (see ECtHR, *Kolevi v. Bulgaria*, no. 1108/02, judgment of 5 November 2009, § 191).
9. The European Court has also stated that the procedural obligation to provide some form of effective official investigation exists also when an individual has gone missing in life-threatening circumstances and is not confined to cases where it is apparent that the disappearance was caused by an agent of the State (see ECtHR [GC], *Varnava and Others v. Turkey*, cited in § 44 above, at § 136,ECtHR [GC], *Mocanu and Others v. Romania*, nos 10865/09, 45886/07 and 32431/08, judgment of 17 September 2014, § 317).
10. The authorities must act of their own motion once the matter has come to their attention, and they cannot leave it to the initiative of the next-of-kin either to lodge a formal complaint or to take responsibility for the conduct of any investigative procedure (see ECtHR, *Ahmet Özkan and Others v. Turkey*, no. 21689/93, judgment of 6 April 2004, § 310, see also ECtHR, *Isayeva v. Russia*, no. 57950/00, judgment of 24 February 2005, § 210, ECtHR [GC], *Mocanu and Others v. Romania*, cited above, § 321).
11. Setting out the standards of an effective investigation, the Court has stated that besides being independent, accessible to the victim’s family, carried out with reasonable promptness and expedition and affording a sufficient element of public scrutiny of the investigation or its results, the investigation must also be effective in the sense that it is capable of leading to a determination of whether the death was caused unlawfully and if so, to the identification and punishment of those responsible (see ECtHR [GC], *Varnava and Others v.* Turkey, cited in § 44 above, at § 191; see also ECtHR, *Palić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina*, no. 4704/04, judgment of 15 February 2011, § 63). This is not an obligation of results but of means. The authorities must take whatever reasonable steps they can to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia eye-witness testimony, forensic evidence and, where appropriate, an autopsy which provides a complete and accurate record of injury and an objective analysis of the clinical findings, including the cause of death. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of death or the person or persons responsible will risk falling foul of this standard (see ECtHR, *Ahmet Özkan and Others v. Turkey*, cited above, at § 312, and ECtHR, *Isayeva v. Russia*, cited above, at § 212).
12. In particular, the investigation’s conclusion must be based on thorough, objective and impartial analysis of all relevant elements. Failing to follow an obvious line of enquiry undermines to a decisive extent the ability to establish the circumstances of the case and the identity of those responsible (see ECtHR, *Kolevi v. Bulgaria*, cited in § 69, at § 201). Nevertheless, the nature and degree of scrutiny which satisfy the minimum threshold of the investigation’s effectiveness depend on the circumstances of the particular case. They must be assessed on the basis of all relevant facts and with regard to the practical realities of the investigative work (see ECtHR, *Velcea and Mazăre v. Romania*, no. 64301/01, judgment of 1 December 2009, § 105). At the same time, the authorities must always make a serious attempt to find out what happened and should not rely on hasty or ill-founded conclusions to close their investigation (see ECtHR [GC], *El-Masri v. “The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”*, no. 39630/09, judgment of 13 December 2012, § 183; ECtHR [GC], *Mocanu and Others v. Romania*, cited in § 70 above, at § 322).
13. A requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition is implicit in this context. Even where there may be obstacles or difficulties which prevent progress in an investigation in a particular situation, a prompt response by the authorities is vital in maintaining public confidence in their adherence to the rule of law and in preventing any appearance of collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts (see ECtHR, *Paul and Audrey Edwards* *v. the United Kingdom*, no. 46477/99, judgment of 14 March 2002, § 72, ECtHR [GC], *Mocanu and Others v. Romania*, cited in § 70 above, at § 323).
14. Specifically with regard to persons disappeared and later found dead, the Court has stated that the procedures of exhuming and identifying mortal remains do not exhaust the obligation under Article 2 of the ECHR. The Court holds that “the procedural obligation arising from a disappearance will generally remain as long as the whereabouts and fate of the person are unaccounted for, and it is thus of a continuing nature” (ECtHR, *Palić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina*, cited in § 72 above, § 46; in the same sense ECtHR [GC], *Varnava and Others v. Turkey*, cited in § 44 above, § 148, *Aslakhanova and Others v. Russia*, nos. 2944/06 and others, judgment of 18 December 2012, § 122). However, the Court also stresses that this procedural obligation “does not come to an end even on discovery of the body .... This only casts light on one aspect of the fate of the missing person and the obligation to account for the disappearance and death, as well as to identify and prosecute any perpetrator of unlawful acts in that connection, will generally remain” (ECtHR, *Palić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina*, cited above, § 46; in the same sense ECtHR [GC], *Varnava and Others v. Turkey*, cited above, § 145). While the location and the subsequent identification of the mortal remains of the victim may in themselves be significant achievements, the procedural obligation under Article 2 continues to exist (see ECtHR, *Palić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina*, cited above, § 64).
15. On the requirement of public scrutiny, the Court has further stated that there must be a sufficient element of public scrutiny of the investigation or its results to secure accountability in practice as well as in theory. The degree of public scrutiny required may well vary from case to case. In all cases, however, the victim's next-of-kin must be involved in the procedure to the extent necessary to safeguard his or her legitimate interests (see ECtHR, *Ahmet Özkan and Others v. Turkey*, cited in § 71 above, at §§ 311‑314; ECtHR, *Isayeva v. Russia*, cited in § 71 above, §§ 211-214 and the cases cited therein; ECtHR [GC], *Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom*, no. 55721/07, judgment of 7 July 2011, § 167, ECHR 2011, ECtHR [GC], *Mocanu and Others v. Romania*, cited in § 70 above, at § 324).
16. The Court has also underlined the great importance of an effective investigation in establishing the truth of what transpired thereby satisfying the right to truth not only for the families of victims, but also for other victims of similar crimes, as well as the general public, who have the right to know what occurred (ECtHR, *El-Masri v. “The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”*, cited in § 73 above, § 191; ECtHR, *Al Nashiri v. Poland*, no. 28761/11, judgment of 24 July 2014, §§ 495-496). United Nations bodies also recognise the importance of the right to truth. In the words of the United Nations Secretary-General, “the right to truth implies knowing the full and complete truth about the violations and the events that transpired, their specific circumstances and who participated in them. In the case of missing persons … it also implies the right to know the fate and whereabouts of the victim” (see Report of the UN Secretary-General, Missing Persons, UN Document A/67/267, 8 August 2012, § 5; see also HRC,  *Schedko and Bondarenko v. Belarus*, Communication no. 886/1999, views of 3 April 2003, § 10.2, CCPR/C/77/D/886/1999; HRC, *Mariam, Philippe, Auguste and Thomas Sankara v. Burkina Faso*, Communication no. 1159/2003, views of 8 March 2006, § 10.2, CCPR/C/86/D/1159/2003; UN Human Rights Council, Resolutions 9/11 and 12/12: Right to the Truth, 24 September 2008 and 12 October 2009; Preamble and Article 24 (2) of the Convention for the Protection of All People from Enforced Disappearance, cited in § 106 above; see also Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Mr Ben Emmerson, *Framework Principles for securing the accountability of public officials for gross and systematic human rights violations committed in the context of State counter-terrorist initiatives*, UN Document A/HRC/22/52, 1 March 2013, § 23-26).
17. *Applicability of Article 2 to the Kosovo context*
18. The Panel is conscious that Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović was abducted shortly after the deployment of UNMIK in Kosovo in the aftermath of the armed conflict, when crime, violence and insecurity were rife.
19. On his part, the SRSG does not contest that UNMIK had a duty to investigate the present case under ECHR Article 2. However, according to the SRSG, the unique circumstances pertaining to the Kosovo context and to UNMIK’s deployment in the first phase of its mission shall be taken into account when assessing whether this investigation is in compliance with Article 2 of the ECHR. In substance, the SRSG argues that it is not possible to apply to UNMIK the same standards applicable to a State in a normal situation.
20. The Panel considers that this raises two main questions: first, whether the standards of Article 2 continue to apply in situation of conflict or generalised violence and, second, whether such standards shall be considered fully applicable to UNMIK.
21. As regards the applicability of Article 2 to UNMIK, the Panel recalls that with the adoption of the UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/1 on 25 July 1999 UNMIK undertook an obligation to observe internationally recognised human rights standards in exercising its functions. This undertaking was detailed in UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/24 of 12 December 1999, by which UNMIK assumed obligations under certain international human rights instruments, including the ECHR. In this respect, the Panel has already found that it is true that UNMIK’s interim character and related difficulties must be duly taken into account with regard to a number of situations, but under no circumstances could these elements be taken as a justification for diminishing standards of respect for human rights, which were duly incorporated into UNMIK’s mandate (see HRAP, *Milogorić* *and Others,* nos. 38/08 and others, opinion of 24 March 2011, § 44; *Berisha and Others,* nos. 27/08 and others, opinion of 23 February 2011,§ 25; *Lalić and Others*, nos. 09/08 and others, opinion of 9 June 2012, § 22).
22. Concerning the applicability of Article 2 to situations of conflict or generalised violence, the Panel recalls that the European Court of Human Rights has established the applicability of Article 2 to post-conflict situations, including in countries of the former Yugoslavia (see, among other examples, ECtHR, *Palić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina,* cited in § 72 above, and ECtHR, *Jularić v. Croatia*, no. 20106/06, judgment of 20 January 2011). The Court has further held that that the procedural obligation under Article 2 continues to apply in “difficult security conditions, including in a context of armed conflict” (see ECtHR [GC], *Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom*, cited in § 76 above, at § 164; see also ECtHR, *Güleç v. Turkey*, judgment of 27 July 1998, § 81, Reports 1998-IV; ECtHR, *Ergi v. Turkey*, judgment of 28 July 1998, §§ 79 and 82, Reports 1998-IV; ECtHR, *Ahmet Özkan and Others v. Turkey*, cited in § 71 above, at §§ 85-90, 309-320 and 326-330;ECtHR, *Isayeva v. Russia*, cited in § 71 above, at §§ 180 and 210; ECtHR, *Kanlibaş v. Turkey*, no. 32444/96, judgment of 8 December 2005, §§ 39-51).
23. The Court has acknowledged that “where the death to be investigated under Article 2 occurs in circumstances of generalised violence, armed conflict or insurgency, obstacles may be placed in the way of investigators and […] concrete constraints may compel the use of less effective measures of investigation or may cause an investigation to be delayed” (see, ECtHR [GC], *Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom,* cited above, at §164;ECtHR, *Bazorkina v. Russia*, no. 69481/01, judgment of 27 July 2006, § 121). Nonetheless, the Court has held that “the obligation under Article 2 to safeguard life entails that, even in difficult security conditions, all reasonable steps must be taken to ensure that an effective, independent investigation is conducted into alleged breaches of the right to life (see, amongst many other examples, ECtHR, *Kaya v. Turkey*, cited in § 69 above, at §§ 86‑92; ECtHR, *Ergi v Turkey,* cited above, at §§ 82-85; ECtHR [GC], *Tanrıkulu v. Turkey*, no. 23763/94, judgment of 8 July 1999, §§ 101-110, ECHR 1999-IV; ECtHR, *Khashiyev and Akayeva v. Russia*, nos. 57942/00 and 57945/00, judgment of 24 February 2005, §§ 156-166; ECtHR, *Isayeva v. Russia*, cited above, at §§ 215‑224; ECtHR, *Musayev and Others v. Russia*, nos. 57941/00 and others, judgment of 26 July 2007, §§ 158-165).
24. Similarly, the HRC has held that the right to life, including its procedural guarantees, shall be considered as the supreme right from which no derogation is permitted even in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation (see, HRC, General Comment No. 6, cited in § 68 above, at § 1; HRC, *Abubakar Amirov and Aïzan Amirova v. Russi*a*n Federation*, communication no. 1447/2006, views of 22 April 2009, § 11.2, CCPR/C/95/D/1447/2006). Further, the HRC has stated the applicability of Article 2 (3), 6 and 7 of the ICCPR with specific reference to UNMIK’s obligation to conduct proper investigations on disappearances and abductions in Kosovo (see HRC, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Kosovo (Serbia), 14 August 2006, §§ 12-13, CCPR/C/UNK/CO/1).
25. The Panel appreciates the difficulties encountered by UNMIK during the first phase of its deployment. The Panel notes that the appropriate importance attached to the issue of missing persons in Kosovo meant that UNMIK had to take into account both the humanitarian and criminal dimensions of the situation. In particular, the Panel considers that the importance attached to the criminal investigations and the difficulties in Kosovo that limited the abilities of investigating authorities to conduct such investigations, as described by the SRSG, made it crucial that UNMIK establish from the outset an environment conducive to the performance of meaningful investigations. This would involve putting in place a system that would include such elements as the allocation of overall responsibility for the supervision and monitoring of progress in investigations, provision for the regular review of the status of investigations, and a process for the proper handover of cases between different officers or units of UNMIK Police. Such a system should also take account of the protection needs of victims and witnesses (see, *mutatis mutandis*, ECtHR, *R.R. and Others v. Hungary*, no. 19400/11, judgment of 4 December 2012, §§ 28-32), as well as to consider the special vulnerability of displaced persons in post-conflict situations (see ECtHR [GC], *Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan,* no. 40167/06, decision of 14 December 2011, § 145; and ECtHR [GC], *Chiragov and Others v. Armenia*, no. 13216/05, decision of 14 December 2011, § 146). While understanding that the deployment and the organisation of the police and justice apparatus occurred gradually, the Panel deems that this process was completed in 2003 when the police and justice system in Kosovo was described as being “well-functioning” and “sustainable” by the UN Secretary-General (see § 19 above).
26. The Panel further notes that its task is not to review relevant practices or alleged obstacles to the conduct of effective investigations *in abstracto*, but only in relation to their specific application to the particular circumstances of a situation subject of a complaint before it (see, ECtHR, *Brogan and Others v. the United Kingdom*, judgment of 29 November 1988, § 53, Series A no. 145-B). The Panel thus agrees with the SRSG that the nature and degree of scrutiny to determine whether the effectiveness of the investigation satisfies the minimum threshold depends on the circumstances of the particular case. For these reasons, the Panel considers that it will establish with regard to each case if all reasonable steps were taken to conduct an effective investigation as prescribed by Article 2, having regard to the realities of the investigative work in Kosovo.
27. Lastly, in response to the SRSG’s objection that Article 2 must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities, either in the context of policing activities or that of priorities and resources, the Panel takes into account that the European Court has established that what amounts to an impossible and/or disproportionate burden must be measured by the very particular facts and contexts (see ECtHR, *Palić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina,* cited in § 72 above, at § 70; ECtHR, *Brecknell v. The United Kingdom,* no. 32457/04, judgment of 27 November 2007, § 62).
28. The Panel puts on record that it has already analysed the effectiveness under Article 2 of numerous investigations conducted by UNMIK with respect to killings, abductions and disappearances related to the conflict in Kosovo. The Panel has identified common shortcomings in these investigations such as delays in the registration of the cases and lengthy periods of inactivity from the outset and in the period within the Panel’s jurisdiction; failure to take basic investigative steps and follow obvious lines of enquiry; lack of coordination among different units of UNMIK Police; lack of regular and meaningful reviews of cases; lack of prosecutorial oversight and failure to provide family members with minimum necessary information on the status of the investigation (compare with ECtHR, *Aslakhanova and Others v. Russia*, cited in § 75 above, § 123). The Panel also records systemic failures such as a deficient system of setting investigative priorities and lack of proper handover. In the great majority of these cases the Panel has found that the investigations were not effective in the meaning of Article 2 and that UNMIK’s failures, which persisted throughout the period of the Panel’s jurisdiction, could not be justified in the light of difficulties encountered by UNMIK at the beginning of its mission.
29. *Compliance with Article 2 in the present case*
30. With respect to the present case, the Panel notes that there were obvious shortcomings in the conduct of the investigation from its commencement. However, in light of the considerations developed above concerning its limited temporal jurisdiction (see § 44 above), the Panel recalls that it is competent *ratione temporis* to evaluate the compliance of the investigations with Article 2 of the ECHR only for the period after 23 April 2005, while taking into consideration the state of the cases at that date (see ECtHR, *Palić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina,* cited in § 72 above, at § 70). The period under review ends on 9 December 2008, with EULEX taking over responsibility in the area of administration of justice (see § 21 above).
31. Based on the documents in the file, UNMIK was informed of Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović’s abduction at the latest on 4 September 1999, when his sister called UNMIK Police for the first time to inform them about the matter. It is documented in the file that she made a second telephone call on 21 September 1999. While expressing its concern that only the first pages of the “Police Enquiry Proforma” documenting these telephone calls can be found in the file, the Panel notes that, due to the incompleteness of this part of the file, it cannot establish with certainty whether Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović’s sister provided UNMIK Police at this time with information concerning the alleged kidnappers. The Panel notes that it is however stated on the first page of the “Police Enquiry Proforma”, dated 4 September 1999, that Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović’s mother had witnessed the abduction. The Panel also notes that the only action taken by UNMIK Police following the report was opening a missing person case concerning Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović. There is no document in the file showing that UNMIK tried to take a statement from Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović’s sister and mother, notwithstanding the fact that the latter had been indicated as an eye-witness to the abduction (see § 31 above).
32. The investigative file shows that in February 2000 the MPU wrote a memorandum to several offices of UNMIK Police and UNMIK border authorities throughout Kosovo to enquire if they had any information about the case of Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović. In March 2000, the MPU received a negative response from three of UNMIK Police offices contacted (see § 33 above). Thereafter, the only documented actions undertaken by the MPU relate to inputting the ante-mortem information concerning Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović, mainly gathered through the ICRC, in to the MPU database between June 2000 and July 2003 (see § 33 above).
33. The Panel agrees that UNMIK’s actions resulted in the discovery of the mortal remains of Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović in 2002 and in their identification through DNA testing in the spring of 2003. Although this must be considered in itself an achievement, the Panel recalls that the procedural obligation under Article 2 did not come to an end with the discovery, identification and subsequent handover of Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović’s mortal remains, especially as they showed signs of a violent death. The Panel notes that this was a moment of renewed contact with the family. Nonetheless, no further investigative action was carried over to gather information from Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović’s family members or any other action aimed at identifying the perpetrators.
34. In May 2004, a criminal complaint was filed on behalf of the complainant with an International Prosecutor in Prishtinë/Priština, which provides the names of two persons, D.Ra. and “the son of [A.E.]” (the same persons mentioned by the complainant in her submission to the Panel of December 2011, see §§ 25 and 35 above) allegedly responsible for the abduction and killing of Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović. The complaint also indicates that Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović’s mother, was an eye-witness to the abduction and that Mr V.S. (also mentioned in §§ 25 and 35 above) was reportedly at some point detained and tortured in a certain location along with Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović before managing to escape. The Panel notes with concern that UNMIK investigators ignored this information, as there is no evidence in the file that UNMIK made any effort to contact and interview the above-mentioned suspects and eye-witnesses. Similarly, the file shows that no other effort was made to identify other potential witnesses or the place in which Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović had been allegedly detained and tortured by the KLA.
35. The Panel also notes that according to e-mails and interoffice memoranda, dated July 2004 and February 2005, UNMIK Police came across the name of Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović while conducting a wider investigation into crimes committed by a number of KLA members during and in the aftermath of the Kosovo conflict. In particular, the name of Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović appears in a list of six persons kidnapped and murdered at the orders of one E.X. Again, the Panel notes with concern there is not any indication in the file that any other action was taken by UNMIK to follow-up on this additional investigative lead.
36. Coming to the period within its jurisdiction, starting from 23 April 2005, the Panel notes that after that critical date the failure to conduct the necessary investigative actions persisted. Accordingly, inadequacies existing up until that date were not addressed. Thus, in accordance with the continuing obligation to investigate (see § 75 above), the assessment of the whole investigation is brought within the period of the Panel’s jurisdiction.
37. In addition, the Panel considers that as those responsible for the crime had not been identified, UNMIK Police was obliged to use the means at their disposal to regularly review the progress of the investigation to ensure that nothing had been overlooked and that any new evidence had been considered, as well as to inform the relatives regarding the progress of this investigation.
38. The Panel notes that no action whatsoever was taken by UNMIK Police in the period within the Panel’s temporal jurisdiction and that the case concerning Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović’s killing was not reviewed until it was handed over to EULEX in 2009. Only at this time, almost ten years after the abduction of Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović, did an International Prosecutor of the SPRK request the police to make further investigations, including interviewing the alleged suspects and witnesses, whose names had been known to UNMIK Police at the latest since May 2005. The Panel fears that such inaction on the side of UNMIK indicates a reluctance on the part of UNMIK Police to pursue the perpetrators, in particular when there are allegations or other leads pointing towards persons associated with the KLA (see HRAP, Ibraj, cases nos 14/09 and others, opinion of 6 August 2014, § 155).
39. In this respect, the Panel finds inappropriate and not correspondent to the truth the SRSG’s statements that Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović’s family members did not provide investigators with any leads or information for further investigation and that the lack of information, witnesses and suspects in the case impeded the identification of possible perpetrators to be brought to justice. Nor, contrary to the SRSG’s request, the information provided by the complainant to the Panel in December 2011 adds any material that was not available in the investigative files.
40. In addition, the Panel recalls that almost any investigation at its initial stage lacks a significant amount of information. Finding the necessary information to fill those gaps is the main goal of any investigative activity. Therefore, a lack of information should not be used as an argument to defend inaction by the investigative authorities. Thus, it appears that, instead of actively searching for information and leads, UNMIK Police simply waited for further information to appear by itself (see e.g. HRAP, *P.S*., no. 48/09, opinion of 31 October 2013, § 107; HRAP, *Stevanović*, no. 48/09, opinion of 14 December 2014, § 111).In this situation it may have led to the loss of potential evidence. Indeed the Panel notes that witness V.S. died before being interviewed (see § 25 above).
41. The apparent lack of any adequate reaction from UNMIK Police, and of any adequate action at later stages, may have suggested to the perpetrators that the authorities were either not able, or not willing to investigate such criminal acts. Such an attitude of the authorities towards the gravest crimes in any society, and especially in post-conflict circumstances, inevitably creates a culture of impunity among the criminals and can lead to a worsening of the situation. The problems that UNMIK had encountered at the beginning of its mission, which were discussed above, do not justify such inaction, either at the outset or subsequently.
42. The Panel is also aware that the duty to investigate is not breached merely because the investigation does not produce a satisfactory result. Nevertheless, such an investigation must be undertaken in a serious manner and not be a mere formality. The Panel considers that, having regard to all the circumstances of the particular case, not all reasonable steps were taken by UNMIK towards identifying the perpetrators and bringing them to justice. In this sense the Panel considers that the investigation was not adequate and did not comply with the requirements of promptness, expedition and effectiveness (see § 74 above), as required by Article 2 of the ECHR.
43. As concerns the requirement of public scrutiny, the Panel recalls that Article 2 also requires the victims’ next-of-kin to be involved in the investigation to the extent necessary to safeguard his or her legitimate interests.
44. The complainant states that she is not aware if any investigation about her husband’s abduction and killing was ever conducted by UNMIK or KFOR. The Panel notes that, based on the investigative file, the only contacts between UNMIK investigators and Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović’s family were the two telephone calls made at the initiative of the his sister when she reported the abduction to UNMIK Police in September 1999 (see § 31 above). No further contact is documented in the file, including any attempts to contact the complainant, or Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović’s mother, who reportedly witnessed the abduction, or Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović’s brother, whose contact details were also provided in the ICRC Victim Identification Form. In light of the foregoing, the Panel considers that the investigation was not open to any public scrutiny, as required by Article 2 of the ECHR.
45. In light of the shortcomings and deficiencies in the investigation described above, the Panel considers that the case of Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović, as well as other cases of killings, abductions and disappearances previously examined, well exemplify a pattern of perfunctory and unproductive investigations conducted by the UNMIK Police into killings and disappearances in Kosovo (see § 88 above; compare with HRC, *Abubakar Amirov and Aïzan Amirova v. Russian Federation*, cited in § 84 above, at § 11.4; see also HRAP, *Bulatović*, no. 166/09, opinion of 13 November 2014, §§ 85 and 101).
46. Therefore, the Panel concludes that UNMIK failed to carry out an effective investigation into the abduction and killing of Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 2, procedural limb, of the ECHR.

**V. CONCLUDING COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

1. In light of the Panel’s findings in this case, the Panel is of the opinion that some form of reparation is necessary.
2. The Panel notes that enforced disappearances and arbitrary executions constitute serious violations of human rights which, shall be investigated and prosecuted under any circumstances. The Panel also notes that UNMIK as the territorial administration of Kosovo from 1999 to 2008 had the primary responsibility to effectively investigate and prosecute those responsible for killings, abductions or disappearances in life threatening circumstances. Its failure to do so constitutes a further serious violation of the rights of the victims and their next-of-kin, in particular the right to have the truth of the matter determined.
3. The Panel notes the SRSG’s own concerns that the inadequate resources, especially at the outset of UNMIK’s mission, made compliance with UNMIK’s human rights obligations difficult to achieve.
4. It would normally be for UNMIK to take the appropriate measures in order to put an end to the violation noted and to redress as far as possible the effects thereof. However, as the Panel noted above (see § 21), UNMIK’s responsibility with regard to the administration of justice in Kosovo ended on 9 December 2008. UNMIK therefore is no longer in a position to take measures that will have a direct impact on the investigations that are still pending before EULEX or local authorities. Likewise, following the unilateral declaration of independence by the Kosovo Provisional Institutions of Self-Government on 17 February 2008 and subsequently, the entry into force of the Kosovo Constitution on 15 June 2008, UNMIK ceased to perform executive functions in Kosovo, this fact limiting its ability to provide full and effective reparation of the violation committed, as required by established principles of international human rights law.
5. The Panel considers that this factual situation does not relieve UNMIK from its obligation to redress as far as possible the effects of the violations for which it is responsible.

**With respect to the complainant and the case the Panel considers appropriate that UNMIK:**

* In line with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights on situations of limited State jurisdiction (see ECtHR [GC], *Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia*, no. 48787/99, judgment of 8 July 2004, *ECHR*, 2004-VII, § 333; ECtHR, *Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom*, no. 61498/08, judgment of 2 March 2010, § 171; ECtHR [GC], *Catan and Others v. Moldova and Russia*, nos. 43370/04, 8252/05 and 18454/06, judgment of 19 October 2012, § 109), must endeavour, with all means available to it *vis-à-vis* the competent authorities in Kosovo, to obtain assurances that the investigations concerning the case at issue will be continued in compliance with the requirements of an effective investigation as envisaged by Article 2, that the circumstances surrounding the abduction and killing of Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović will be established and that perpetrators will be brought to justice. The complainant and/or other next-of-kin shall be informed of such proceedings and relevant documents shall be disclosed to them, as necessary;
* Publicly acknowledges, including through media, within a reasonable time, responsibility with respect to UNMIK’s failure to adequately investigate the abduction and killing of Mr Ðorđe Kuzmanović and make a public apology to the complainant and her family in this regard;
* Takes appropriate steps towards payment of adequate compensation to the complainant for the moral damage suffered due to UNMIK’s failure to conduct an effective investigation.

**The Panel also considers appropriate that UNMIK:**

* In line with the UN General Assembly Resolution on “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law” (A/Res/60/147, 21 March 2006), takes appropriate steps, through other UN affiliated entities operating in Kosovo, local bodies and non-governmental organisations, for the realisation of a full and comprehensive reparation programme, including restitution compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition, for the victims from all communities of serious violations of human rights which occurred during and in the aftermath of the Kosovo conflict;
* Takes appropriate steps before competent bodies of the United Nations, including the UN Secretary-General, towards the allocation of adequate human and financial resources to ensure that international human rights standards are upheld at all times by the United Nations, including when performing administrative and executive functions over a territory, and to make provision for effective and independent monitoring.

**FOR THESE REASONS,**

The Panel, unanimously,

1. **FINDS THAT THERE HAS BEEN A VIOLATION OF THE PROCEDURAL OBLIGATION UNDER ARTICLE 2 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS;**
2. **RECOMMENDS THAT UNMIK:**
3. **URGES THE COMPETENT AUTHORITIES IN KOSOVO TO TAKE ALL POSSIBLE STEPS IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE ABDUCTION AND KILLING OF MR ÐORÐE KUZMANOVIĆ IS CONTINUED IN COMPLIANCE WITH ARTICLE 2 OF THE ECHR AND THAT THE PERPETRATORS ARE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE;**
4. **PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGES, INCLUDING THROUGH MEDIA, RESPONSIBILITY FOR ITS FAILURE TO CONDUCT AN EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION INTO THE ABDUCTION AND KILLING OF MR ÐORÐE KUZMANOVIĆ AND MAKES A PUBLIC APOLOGY TO THE COMPLAINANT;**
5. **TAKES APPROPRIATE STEPS TOWARDS PAYMENT OF ADEQUATE COMPENSATION FOR MORAL DAMAGE IN RELATION TO THE FINDING OF VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE ECHR TO THE COMPLAINANT;**
6. **TAKES APPROPRIATE STEPS TOWARDS THE REALISATION OF A FULL AND COMPREHENSIVE REPARATION PROGRAMME;**
7. **TAKES APPROPRIATE STEPS AT THE UNITED NATIONS AS A GUARANTEE OF NON REPETITION;**
8. **TAKES IMMEDIATE AND EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PANEL AND TO INFORM THE COMPLAINANT AND THE PANEL ABOUT FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS CASE.**

Andrey Antonov Marek Nowicki

Executive Officer Presiding Member

*Annex*

**ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**

**CCIU** - Central Criminal Investigation Unit

**CCPR –** International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

**DOJ** - Department of Justice

**DPPO** - District Public Prosecutor’s Office

**ECHR** - European Convention on Human Rights

**ECtHR** - European Court of Human Rights

**EU** – European Union

**EULEX** - European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo

**FRY** - Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

**FYROM** - Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

**HRAP** - Human Rights Advisory Panel

**HLC-** Humanitarian Law Centre

**HRC** - United Nation Human Rights Committee

**HQ** - Headquarters

**IACtHR** – Inter-American Court of Human Rights

**ICMP** - International Commission of Missing Persons

**ICRC** - International Committee of the Red Cross

**ICTY** - International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia

**KFOR** - International Security Force (commonly known as Kosovo Force)

**KLA** - Kosovo Liberation Army

**MoU -** Memorandum of Understanding

**MPU** - Missing Persons Unit

**NATO** - North Atlantic Treaty Organization

**OMPF** - Office on Missing Persons and Forensics

**OSCE** - Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

**RIU** - Regional Investigation Unit

**SIU –** Special Investigations Unit of the UNMIK Security

**SPRK** – EULEX Special Prosecution Office

**SRSG** - Special Representative of the Secretary-General

**UN** - United Nations

**UNHCR** - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

**UNMIK** - United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

**VRIC** - Victim Recovery and Identification Commission

**WCIU** - War Crimes Investigation Unit

1. A list of abbreviations and acronyms contained in the text can be found in the attached Annex. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. The references drawn upon by the Panel in setting out this general background include: OSCE, “As Seen, as Told”, Vol. 1 (October 1998 – June 1999) and Vol. II (14 June – 31 October 1999); quarterly reports of the UN Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo; UNMIK Police Annual Reports (2000, 2001); Humanitarian Law Centre, “Abductions and Disappearances of non-Albanians in Kosovo” (2001); Humanitarian Law Centre, “Kosovo Memory Book” (htpp://www.kosovomemorybook.org); UNMIK Office on Missing Persons and Forensics, Activity Report 2002-2004; European Court of Human Rights, *Behrami and Behrami v. France* and *Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway*, nos. 71412/01 and 78166/01, decision of 2 May 2007; International Commission on Missing Persons, “The Situation in Kosovo: a Stock Taking” (2010); data issued by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, (available at [www.unhchr.org](http://www.unhchr.org)) and by the International Committee of the Red Cross (available at <http://familylinks.icrc.org/kosovo/en>). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. The OMPF database is not open to public. The Panel accessed it with regard to this case on 15 January 2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. The ICMP database is available at: <http://www.ic-mp.org/fdmsweb/index.php?w=mp_details&l=en> (accessed on 15 January 2015). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)